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INTRODUCTION
Commonly recognized as necessary for societal progress,' intellec-
tual property rights constitute a battlefield where the interests of corpora-
tions and authors are often said to conflict with those of the public.
Contrary to Jeremy Bentham's statement that copyright "produces an in-
finite effect, and it costs nothing,"'2 constitutional advocates and consum-
t J.D. Candidate, Columbia Law School, 2006; M.P.A., Princeton University, 2003;
B.A. (Social Studies), Harvard University, 2000.
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (declaring the purpose of patents and copyrights to be
the promotion of "the Progress of Science and useful Arts," a sentiment that has been echoed
throughout U.S. jurisprudence).
2 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BEN-
THAM 31, 71 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
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ers argue that intellectual property rights impose unjustifiable costs on
the public. Jeremy Waldron echoes this sentiment when he concludes
that property rights introduce legal duties that "constrain conduct and in
that sense limit freedom." 3 On this battlefield, authors' and inventors'
claims to exclusive property rights meet the counterclaim that intellectual
creations should enter the public domain for unencumbered, constructive
use by future creators.
Arguing that intellectual property (hereinafter "IP") rights lie at the
heart of social progress, IP advocates have long sought exclusive rights
and accompanying financial rewards for original creations. 4 By their ac-
count, financial benefits provide incentives crucial for private entities to
invest in often long, costly work to create socially beneficial products.
The United States Constitution and jurisprudence remain sympathetic to
this claim, even as stakes are high and growing higher in this escalating
debate. As the Walt Disney Corporation lobbied Congress to extend
copyrights protections by an additional 20 years in 1998,5 and as patent
requests in biotechnology now reach expected values of billions of dol-
lars,6 an institution originally intended to benefit society seems danger-
ously skewed towards producers. Increased rights and rewards accorded
to producers entail costs borne by the public and perhaps even impede
the very social progress that patents seek to promote. 7 With recent legis-
lation sure to spark further debate about further fair use restrictions 8 and
amidst well-publicized multi-million dollar legal battles over patent own-
ership, 9 it may be time to re-examine intellectual property both in the
abstract and the pragmatic.
The guiding question throughout this essay is whether IP practices
can be justified on philosophical grounds, and, if so, what type of system
3 Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI-KENT L. REv. 841, 844 (1993).
4 Id. at 844-45.
5 The resulting legislation is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, nicknamed the
"Mickey Mouse Copyright Law." See Bill Hillburg, Writer's Block: High Court to Look at
Copyright Laws, THE DAILY NEWS OF Los ANGELES, Sept. 8, 2002, at N 1; see also High Court
Set to Tackle 'Mickey Mouse' Copyright Case (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www/freedom
forum.org/templates/document.aspdocumentlD=17066 (explaining that the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 quickly became known as the "Mickey Mouse Extension Act").
6 See Arlene Weintraub, The Clone Wars, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 25, 2002, at 96 (esti-
mating "the potential market to be well over $10 billion a year").
7 See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and Reno v. Eldred,
239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing the argument that the Copyright Term Extension
Act violated the preamble to the Copyright Clause and that extending copyrights does not
promote the progress of science and useful arts).
8 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (1998),
available at http://www.copyfight.gov/legislation/archive. Title II of the Act severely limits
the fair use of copyrighted material on the Internet.
9 See Weintraub, supra note 6, at 96 (describing legal battles over patented
biotechnology).
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would be most compatible with such justifications. "IP practices" in this
article include copyrights and patents, and the term refers specifically to
three features of the institution: identification of the product with the
author through name recognition and attribution; the creator's right to
withhold or limit access to the product; and large economic profits result-
ing from artificially high prices. 10
This article argues that traditional attempts to justify IP practices
through moral desert using Locke or Hegel or egalitarianism are gener-
ally unpersuasive. In contrast, utilitarian arguments that view IP as pro-
viding incentives for social progress are more convincing. Financial
incentives in current IP practices, however, are excessive and introduce
unnecessarily and unjustifiably high social costs, in the process under-
mining the very utilitarian foundation on which they are based.
This article is divided into three main parts. Section I explores de-
sert-based arguments through egalitarianism, Lockean labor-value the-
ory, and Hegelian personality theory. It argues that although public
recognition for inventors is essential to satisfy Hegel's personality the-
ory, artificially high prices and restrictions of use are unjustifiable, par-
ticularly on egalitarian and Lockean grounds. Section II discusses
utilitarian, incentives-based arguments as credible justifications for IP
but argues that our current IP system is over-incentivized. Beyond fair-
ness questions, artificially high prices and low supply create significant
monopolistic deadweight loss and generate unintended consequences that
undermine social progress. Representing the synthesis of these two sec-
tions, Section IV builds a more efficient and philosophically congruent
IP system. The "Compensated IP Proposal" retains financial incentives
for producers but lowers them to a merely sufficient level, transferring
much producer surplus to consumers. The Compensated IP Proposal
contains two components: creators of intellectual products receive cost-
based compensation from the government for their products and in ex-
change and products immediately enter society for unrestricted use. In-
ventors retain all public credit and recognition for their work. This
system would alleviate desert-based objections to current IP practices
while satisfying utilitarian calls for financial incentives to encourage re-
search and development.
10 While many differences exist between copyright and patent law, by limiting "IP prac-
tices" to these three features, this article intends to adapt a very broad and complex discussion
into a narrower treatment. In limiting its scope primarily to authors and research institutions,
this article also omits major areas such as like information technology.
2004]
116 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14:113
I. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR IP - DESERT
Various authors have discussed the merits of desert arguments in
IP."1 This section attempts to synthesize and build on existing view-
points. It argues that desert-based justifications for IP are generally un-
persuasive. This section contrasts the Hegelian justification of the
inventor's need for recognition with the Lockean and egalitarian sugges-
tion that IP practices are unjust in that they harm society while providing
undue benefits to undeserving individuals.
A. EGALITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
In a challenge to utilitarianism, egalitarians prioritize justice over
aggregate welfare in their analysis of social institutions. Articulating this
sentiment, John Rawls wrote, "Each person possesses an inviolability
founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot
override." 12 The concept of justice, ultimately linked to fairness and
equality,1 3 places questions of desert into focus. Individuals, through no
responsibility of their own, have varying endowments in the original po-
sition that affect their success in the quest for primary goods. 14 Realizing
that original endowments de facto punish individuals for disadvantages
outside their control, welfare egalitarians such as Elizabeth Anderson and
G.A. Cohen have argued that society should compensate unfairly disad-
vantaged individuals for their suffering.1 5
The question, then, is as follows: Given advantageous endowment
sets that allow greater material success, do individuals deserve to keep
their earnings? In the IP debate, this is a highly relevant question, and it
is one that luck egalitarians would answer in the negative.
The common argument, articulated by Justin Hughes, that
"[i]ntellectual property is far more egalitarian" 16 than traditional property
is based on the premise that IP is "obtainable by anyone."' 17 In contrast
to tangible property, according to this argument, possibilities for ob-
I I For a sample of these discussions, see Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intel-
lectual Property, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 609 (1993); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1998); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J.
287 (1988).
12 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (rev. ed. 1999).
13 See id. §§ 11-14.
14 See id.
15 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICs 287 (1999);
G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHics 906, 937 (1989) (advocating
compensation for "disadvantages which are not traceable to the subject's choice and which the
subject would choose not to suffer from").
16 Hughes, supra note 11, at 291.
17 Id. at 291.
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taining IP are virtually limitless and only depend on talent.' 8 This view
clashes with egalitarianism for two reasons. First, talent itself is gener-
ally outside an individual's control. Second, resources are increasingly
requisite for the creation of patentable or copyrightable products.
Edwin Hettinger, for example, questions individuals' desert based
on talent and luck. "A person who is born with extraordinary natural
talents, or who is extremely lucky, deserves nothing on the basis of these
characteristics. If such a person puts forward no greater effort than an-
other, she deserves no greater reward."' 9 The author of a novel, for ex-
ample, may have been endowed through no choice or effort of his or her
own with superior creativity. Similarly, a research scientist who develops
the cure for cancer may have been blessed with superior intelligence-
again, through no choice of his or her own. The dominance of "brute
luck,"20 beyond sheer effort in these individuals' accomplishments cast
doubt on their desert of rewards.
Hughes himself later concedes that IP may not be as egalitarian as
he first suggests, writing, "it would not be surprising if historical studies
showed that most holders of copyrights and patents come from at least
middle-class backgrounds." This statement points to the increasingly rel-
evant reality that inventions depend not only on talent and effort but also
on an individual's ability to fund the creative endeavor. Writing a book
or conducting research often require considerable time and alternate sus-
tenance, either through personal financial endowments or outside spon-
sorship, in order to produce successful results.
Few would dispute that natural talents are significant components
for success, but the degree to which such these components should domi-
nate questions of desert in IP is contentious. Ronald Dworkin distin-
guishes between "option luck" and "brute luck" and offers insurance as a
way to bridge the gap and to thereby advance equality of resources.
2'
Characterizing this dichotomy as choice versus circumstance, Samuel
Scheffler notes that the line separating the two is murky at best.22 With
specific regard to talent and abilities, Scheffler writes, "even if talents are
themselves unchosen, people can nevertheless choose whether to develop
them."'23 By suggesting that many circumstances actually arise due to
18 Id. at 291.
19 Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., Winter
1989, at 31, 42 (1989).
20 RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 73
(2000) (differentiating brute luck, which constitutes the effects of random occurrences, from
"option luck," which represents the results of "deliberate and calculated gambles").
21 See DWORKIN, supra note 20, at 73-74.
22 See Samuel Scheffler, What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 19-22 (2003).
23 Id. at 20.
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choice, this reasoning can neutralize luck egalitarians' claims of non-
desert.
To break this stalemate, the discussion's focus should shift from the
IP owner to the rest of society. Economic theory suggests that, in the
short run, society is zero-sum; one person's gain is another's loss, and
financial gains to the inventor derive from payments by other members
of society. 24 In determining the merit and extent of desert, then, the in-
ventor's choice to pursue his or her talents must be balanced with the
cost others shoulder by virtue of their circumstances. Many members of
society may have entirely lacked the talents and the skills necessary to
produce similar inventions and yet are now forced to pay artificially high
prices due to IP practices. When IP de facto punishes naturally disad-
vantaged individuals by imposing high financial costs on them while of-
fering financial rewards to inventors, the justice of IP practices is drawn
into question.
As time passes, intellectual creation becomes increasingly rigorous,
and potential develops to exacerbate further the effects of individuals'
disadvantaged endowments. As technology progresses and inventions
become increasingly complex, inventors and intellectual contributors re-
quire progressively sophisticated knowledge and skills in order to suc-
ceed. Each patent raises the bar for future inventions; progress becomes
increasingly concentrated in the hands of the best endowed. The ability
to benefit from IP today is much more contingent upon talent and natural
abilities than it might have been generations ago.25 Irrespective of the
amount of effort expended and the choices a less-talented individual
makes, it is unlikely that the individual will be able to contribute to bio-
technology, for example, in a way that allows him to claim IP rights.
It is important to note that egalitarianism, as treated in this article,
would not object to modified IP practices. Egalitarianism objects to the
current IP practice of high financial rewards for investors and the resul-
tant undue cost burden placed on consumers, but it does not argue that
inventors should not receive any compensation or recognition for their
work. Instead, egalitarianism would advocate a system of effort-based
24 See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
1177, 1180-83 (2002) (discussing zero-sum in economics in the antitrust context). See also
WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 284-91 (9th ed.
2004) (discussing the relationship between consumer and producer surplus).
25 This realization adds a cross-generational dimension to the LP debate that is particu-
larly relevant to egalitarians because of the centrality of brute luck in the generational disad-
vantage. To be sure, Scheffler's claim that choice and circumstance are related has some
merit, but in the case of generational disadvantages, the answer is clear: individuals can neither
choose nor change the time and generation into which they are born. And yet, such timing is
crucial in determining the degree to which an individual has a choice in overcoming a poor
endowment and benefiting from IP.
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compensation. 26 Unlike talent and natural ability, the effort individuals
exert on projects is entirely their choice.27 Current IP, however, is not
congruent with this egalitarian premise. As Sandra Day O'Connor stated
in a 1991 Supreme Court decision, the test is originality, not "sweat of
the brow."'2
8
B. LOCKEAN LABOR THEORY OF VALUE
At the center of John Locke's labor theory of value lies an age of
abundance and two principles for property acquisition: no waste and no
harm. Current IP practices violate both principles, and the ability to in-
flict harm suggests that the age of abundance is not applicable to IP.
This section builds on others' discussion of Lockean labor theory of
value to strengthen the existing assertion that IP justifications using
Locke tend to be unconvincing.
29
"God gave the World to Men in Common," 30 Locke wrote, specify-
ing in Adam's Title by Donation that "men in common" signifies the
"Species of Man" across the generations.31 He continues, "[God] gave it
to the use of the Industrious and Rational, (and Labour was to be his
Title to it).' ' 3 2 According to Locke, abundant resources and land lay vast
and uncultivated in the state of nature comprising the Common. In this
unlabored state, resources possess little value. Only by mixing one's la-
bor with the resources does one create value and use the Common in the
intended way, thereby according property rights to the individual. Locke
wrote,
Man has a Property in his own Person.... The Labour
of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are
properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
26 See Hettinger, supra note 19, at 42-43 ("Because the effort a person expends is much
more under her control than her innate intelligence, skills, and talents, effort is a far superior
basis for determining desert. To the extent that a person's expenditure of effort is under her
control, effort is the proper criterion for desert.").
27 See id. at 42-43.
28 Waldron, supra note 3, at 853 (citing Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991)).
29 See generally Gordon, supra note 11, at 1544-55 (investigating within the framework
of civil society the possible natural-rights claims to the entitlements of intangible products);
Hughes, supra note 11, at 296-300 (presenting both instrumental and normative interpreta-
tions of Locke's labor theory).
30 JOHN LocKE, The Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 285, § 34, at 309 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960).
31 See JOHN LocKE, The First Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 159, § 30, at 179-80 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960).
32 LocKE, supra note 31, § 34, at 309.
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mixed his Labour with, and joined to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his Property.33
To reconcile individuals' privatization of the Common with the no-
tion that the Common belongs to all mankind, Locke asserted the princi-
ples of "no waste" and "no harm" in property acquisition. Ensuring that
individuals would not acquire more than they could use, "no waste" con-
stitutes a kind of safeguard against "Quarrels or Contentions" arising
from unequal degrees of property acquisition.
34
The no harm principle, also known as the "enough and as good"
provision, 35 ensures that the Common would not be depleted thereby
preventing all individuals from benefiting equally, "[f]or he that leaves
as much as another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at
all."'36 "No waste" and "no harm" preserve the Common's abundance.
After all, "the Possessions [man] could make himself upon the measures
we have given, would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice
the rest of Mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think them-
selves injured by this Man's Incroachment.
' 37
Although Locke did not consider non-tangible property in his trea-
tises, his no waste and no harm principles provide a useful framework
with which to examine IP. Upon closer scrutiny, it is clear that IP, par-
ticularly current IP practices, do not pass muster under the two Lockean
principles. Critics are right to object that the definition of the Common
needs to change in order to accommodate non-tangible goods, but, as
Wendy Gordon has argued, the basic premise of the Common remains
the same, even if the details change. "Everyone has an equal right to use
the common, and everyone needs to use the common for sustenance. '38
Acceptance of this premise is sufficient to make the two principles appli-
cable. The following subsections demonstrate IP's violation of both
principles, supporting the conclusion that Lockean labor theory cannot
endorse current IP practices.
33 Id. § 27, at 305-06.
34 Id. § 31, at 308. In asserting the no waste principle, Locke wrote, "God has given us
all things richly .... But how far has he given it to us? To enjoy. As much as any one can
make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a
Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belong to others." Id. Locke
saw the no-waste principle as a way through which to regulate the quantity of individuals'
possessions. He writes later in the text, "The measure of Property, Nature has well set, by the
Extent of Mens Labour, and the Conveniency of Life: No Mans Labour could subdue, or
appropriate all: nor could his Enjoyment consume more than a small part . Id. § 36, at
310.
35 Id. § 33, at 309.
36 Id.
37 See id. § 36, at 311.
38 Gordon, supra note 11, at 1559.
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1. No Waste Principle
The right of inventors and authors to limit use of their creations
violates the no waste principle. IP practices create financial gains for
individuals by restricting use and raising prices. IP turns a good that is
generally non-rival and non-exclusive into a private good by limiting ac-
cess and prohibiting various uses.39 By limiting access, patents and
copyrights can impede society's consumption of the product and its use
for further development. 40 IP practices thus prevent the product from
realizing its maximum value and deprive society of the product's full
value, creating waste and spoilage.
The failure of resources to reach their full value potential is not a
problem per se. After all, much land lies uncultivated in Locke's state of
nature. A problem arises, however, when individuals want to extract un-
claimed value from resources but are prevented from doing so. The
holder of IP is thus analogous to the Lockean laborer who privatizes
more land than he can till and leaves acres uncultivated. 41 An IP holder
is someone who takes more than his fair share and violates his or her
claim to the Common.
In addition to impeding the creation of new intellectual products and
thereby failing the no waste (or no spoilage) requirement, IP also reduces
others' welfare, thereby violating Locke's no harm principle.
2. No Harm Principle
IP advocates argue that while the quantity of tangible goods is natu-
rally finite, ideas and potential intellectual creations are quantitatively
limitless. 42 Theoretically, then, the age of abundance that ends with the
39 Restrictions on use are the focus of debates about fair use. See, e.g., Wendy Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
40 Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Ef-
fects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 526 (1998) ("There is ample evidence that the goal of intellectual
property law is to balance the incentives given to property owners against the harm exper-
ienced by consumers and next-generation competitors."). A concrete example of how IP rights
limit further development involves patents and reverse engineering. See Pamela Samuelson &
Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575,
1590 (2002) (noting that reverse engineering is banned despite the fact that "a right to reverse-
engineer has a salutary effect on price competition and on the dissemination of know-how that
can lead to new and improved products").
41 See LocKE, supra note 31, § 33, at 309.
42 See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: Intellectual Property and
the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 995, 1001-02 (2003) ("In intellectual prop-
erty, of course, we deal in intangible, nonrivalrous goods. [I]t is also widely recognized that
creativity and invention is a profoundly dynamic process. Creation begets more creation; in-
vention leads to further invention. Information fuels the fire of human progress."); Benjamin
G. Damstedt, Note: Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the Fair Use Doctrine,
112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181, 1189 (2003) (noting that although "the common of tangible goods
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introduction of currency to Locke's physical world should be perpetual
in IP.43 The implication of this is that individuals who are restricted
from using certain intellectual products can simply resort to creating their
own.
Such a claim is fallacious because it denies the role of society in
shaping the tastes of the public and the direction of future inventions.
There are certain areas of innovation that members of a society deem
overwhelmingly valuable, such as medicine and technology. As Jeremy
Waldron notes,
[T]he private appropriation of the public realm of cul-
tural artifacts restricts and controls the moves that can be
made therein by the rest of us. . . .This environment,
having been thrust upon us by those in whose interests
cultural commodities circulate, is now the only one we
have, so that it is now in a sense unfair to deny us the
liberty to make of it what we will.
44
The fact that we live in one society, share a single culture, and are shaped
by similar forces means that intellectual products are not perfectly inter-
changeable. 45 Society's role in shaping the direction of progress further
means that while ideas are technically limitless, the realm of useful and
worthwhile ideas is much more focused and accessible only to those who
have access to previous intellectual products. 46
Some advocates have tried to demonstrate that IP cannot harm indi-
viduals in society by arguing that the intellectual product under question
would not have come into existence without the inventor in the first
place. John Bates Clark argued, for instance, that the owner of intellec-
tual property should be allowed,
exclusive control of something which otherwise might
not and often would not have come into existence at all.
If it would not-if the patented article is something
which society without a patent system would not have
secured at all-the inventor's monopoly hurts nobody.
. .. His gains consist in something from which no one
loses, even while he enjoys them.47
is inherently scarce,. . intangible goods [are] at once unlimited and singular," and detailing
three ways in which intangible goods have unlimited qualities).
43 See LocKE, supra note 31, § 36, at 311.
44 Waldron, supra note 3, at 885.
45 Id. at 883.
46 Id. at 885-86.
47 CLARK, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMic THEORY 360-61 (1907), cited in Waldron, supra
note 3, at 866 n.75.
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From this perspective, it would be implausible for IP to cause harm since
individuals would not have benefited from the product without its crea-
tion. John Stuart Mill echoes this point when he states, "It is no hardship
to any one, to be excluded from what others have produced: they were
not bound to produce it for his use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in
what otherwise would not have existed at all."'48 Aside from the fact that
patents and other intellectual creations typically are the products of many
laborers and not merely that of the latest contributor,49 Mill and Clark's
sentiments fail because exclusive rights through IP constitute hardship to
aspiring creators and consumers.
According to existing literature, an individual "who wants access is
entitled to complain only if he is worse off (in regard to the common)
when he is denied access than he would have been if the item had never
come into existence." Based on this standard, aspiring creators have rea-
son to claim harm. As new intellectual discoveries and products come
into existence, the field inevitably changes. The production of a seminal
work or the discovery of, for example, a cloning procedure irreversibly
alters existing attitudes, beliefs, and culture. Scholars and aspiring cre-
ators require access to these groundbreaking discoveries either to build
on or to revise their own works. Limiting access to and use of these new
creations forces such individuals to maintain their reliance on what
Gordon calls the "now devalued common."
50
Proclaiming that "property is theft,"51 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon of-
fers a complementary, and slightly more forceful, rebuttal of Mill and
Clark's claim. It is not only that creators suffer setbacks when forced to
use a devalued common, it is that they may even be prevented from com-
pleting their work and earning a living. Echoing Reid, Proudhon would
argue that the right to life by definition automatically entails a right to
the means of life-in this case, labor-and that "to prevent the labour of
another is the same sort of injustice as putting him in chains or throwing
him into prison, and it provokes the same resentment. ' 52 Justice de-
mands that individuals maintain their right to labor as a means toward
self-sustenance. For Proudhon, permitting private property inevitably
prevents others' right to labor and self-sustenance. Given that the means
of labor is land, recognizing that the "right of territorial property is to
48 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR AP-
PLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, ch. 2, § 6, cited in Waldron, supra note 3, at 866 n.76.
49 Hettinger, supra note 19, at 39.
50 Id. at 1570.
51 PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 13 (Donald R. Kelley & Bonnie G.
Smith eds. & trans., 1994).
52 Id. at 46-47.
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give up labour... it is to compromise a natural right and to violate our
humanity." 5
3
Applying Proudhon, IP is analogous to property rights over land.
By preventing individuals' access to past intellectual creations, IP inhib-
its scholars' access to their means of intellectual labor. The principle of
fair use, for example, was codified in 1976 and allows individuals to use
copyrighted materials for educational and scholarly work purposes. 54 In-
creasingly, the fair use principle has become embattled in the courts,
steadily infringing on individuals' ability to use the materials even in
good faith.55 The narrowing definition of fair use to the point of disap-
pearance in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 199856 is problem-
atic in itself but becomes even more so in light of the fact that some
scholars need to use previous creations for their own work. By prevent-
ing scholars from accessing prior creations for continued work, IP im-
pedes individuals' studies and prevents the creation of their own
intellectual products. It thus deprives scholars of their means of labor
and affirms Proudhon's objection to property.
Aspiring creators are not the only group harmed by property rights
under IP. The welfare of consumers also declines upon learning of the
existence of a valuable new intellectual product but simultaneously being
prohibited from accessing it.57 To illustrate this point, Gordon proposes
an example where consumers become addicted to a newly manufactured
enzyme.58 Without continued access to the enzyme or knowledge of its
manufacturing process, the public would physically suffer. Gordon con-
cludes that, "Having changed people's position, the inventor cannot then
refuse them the tools they need for surviving under their new condi-
tion."' 59 Examples need not be as extreme as this, however, to make the
same the case effectively. The fact that we live in one society and share
a single culture means that individuals' welfare depends on their relative
valuation of themselves and their status in society, partially determined
by their consumption.
60
Researchers have found empirical justifications for the claim that
relative valuation considerably influences individual utility. Daniel
Kahneman received a Nobel Prize in Economics for his development of
53 See id. at 74.
54 See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-809 (1982).
55 See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 2, 53-
63 (1987).
56 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (1998).
57 See Gordon, supra note II, at 1567.
58 Id. at 1567.
59 Id. at 1568.
60 See generally RAwLs, supra note 12.
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Prospect Theory, which exposes individuals as non-rational actors. 61
According to this theory, loss aversion causes individuals to experience a
disproportionate decline in welfare in the face of a perceived loss relative
to a specific reference point.62 An individual's utility function is not
linear; it is concave above the reference point and convex below it.63
Gains with respect to the status quo result in utility changes that are
smaller in absolute terms than perceived losses.64 Importantly, reference
points (which are closely linked to the status quo) can shift upon receipt
of new information. 65 As individuals learn of new, useful inventions in
society, their reference point rises because the invention becomes a con-
sideration in their relative utility valuation. Since the reference point in-
cludes the new invention, limits or prohibitions placed on consumer use
of the product represents a perceived loss. Particularly with loss aver-
sion, consumers lose significant utility from constraints due to IP.
Clark and Mill may be correct that, rationally, individuals should
not be harmed by being prevented from using something that would not
have existed without IP. As psychology demonstrates, however, individ-
uals are not rational, and their judgments of fairness and justice do not
strictly follow economic laws. 66 In the case of IP, the simple introduc-
tion of a new work alters the landscape of the field. Inevitably, it renders
the public domain less valuable to aspiring creators and lowers consumer
welfare by changing individual reference points and creating the sense of
a loss. On both counts, then, IP violates Locke's no harm principle.
3. Lockean Objections to Current IP Practices
Beyond philosophical objections to a system that allows IP owners
to limit the access of other individuals, Locke's labor theory also poses
challenges to existing IP practices that provide inventors with large fi-
nancial rewards. Locke's labor theory provides a justification only for
laborers to claim the products of their labor. 67 In many cases, however,
the intellectual creation is the product of many researchers over an ex-
tended period of time. Individuals should be rewarded only for the value
61 Press Release, The Royal Swiss Academy of Sciences, The Bank of Sweden Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002 (Oct. 9, 2002), available at http://nobel
prize.org/economics/laureates/2002/press.html (last visited September 14, 2004).
62 Danel Kahnman & Amos Tverskey, Prospect Theory, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND
FRAMES 32 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, eds., 2000).
63 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion and Riskless Choice, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES 144 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, eds., 2000).
64 See Kahnman & Tversky, supra note 62, at 33.
65 Id. at 40.
66 George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Anal-
yses of Political Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 451 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky, eds., 2000).
67 See LOCKE, supra note 31, § 33, at 309.
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they add, "not the total value of the resulting product. '68 An additional
complicating factor is that some IP practices, such as copyrights or pat-
ents, do not provide the bulk of rewards to the individual who invented
or produced the good. Instead, financial rewards go to institutions, pub-
lishing houses, or investors who may have financially supported the
product. It is difficult to justify such practices on philosophical, desert-
based grounds.
C. HEGELIAN SELF-ACTUALIZATION AND PERSONALITY THEORY
More effectively than other philosophies, Hegelian theory can jus-
tify IP through the personality theory, which supports inventors' rights to
public recognition for their IP work. Hegelian theory, however, remains
primarily silent on inventors' rights to large financial gains or limits on
access to the product by others.
Unlike Locke, who believed in natural freedom, Hegel argues that
freedom is a social product that is acquired through exercise of human
capabilities (like thought and judgment) and outside validation.69 While
individuals have free will, they do not fulfill their potential and come
into being until they self-actualize by exerting their will on the external,
physical world. 70 Property thus becomes crucial to an individual's exis-
tence. Hegel noted, "The person must give himself an external sphere of
freedom in order to have being as an Idea. . . . The rational aspect of
property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the super-
seding of mere subjectivity of personality. Not until he has property
does the person exist as reason."'71 By appropriating an object, the indi-
vidual effectively manifests the supremacy of his or her will in relation to
the object, which had lacked personality and being by itself. "From the
point of view of freedom, property, as the first existence of freedom, is
an essential end for itself."'72 To Hegel, property is the embodiment of
personality.
Individuals can take possession in three ways: physical seizure, giv-
ing something form, and designating an object's ownership. 73 While
physical seizure is "the most complete mode of taking possession"74 be-
cause of the immediate presence of the individual and her will, it is also
"subjective, temporary, and extremely limited in scope." 75 By its nature,
68 Hettinger, supra note 19, at 37.
69 See G.F.W. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 41 (Allen Wood ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. § 53.
73 id. § 54.
74 Id. § 55.
75 Id.
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"taking possession is always incomplete in character. I take possession
of no more than I can touch with my body, but it follows immediately
that external objects extend further than I can grasp. '" 76 In contrast to
physical seizure, giving form transcends the individual's physical and
temporal presence. 77 By giving form to an object, "its determinate char-
acter as mine receives an independently existing externality and ceases to
be limited to my presence in this time and space and to my present
knowledge and volition. '78 The object assimilates the individual's ef-
fect, making the appropriation consistent with human self-actualiza-
tion.79 Taking possession of an object by "marking" it, finally, entails
the individual simply designating an object as hers by placing a sign on
the object.80 According to Hegel, this is the most comprehensive method
of taking possession of an object and incorporates the other two meth-
ods. 81 He asserts that the ultimate significance of physically seizing an
object or giving form to something is "likewise a sign, a sign given to
others in order to exclude them and to show that I have placed my will in
the thing."'8
2
In IP, the most relevant ways of taking possession are giving form
to something or marking it for ownership. Herein lies the root for a co-
herent defense of IP. In order to fulfill their potential and transition from
a free spirit into a being, individuals need to interact with the external
sphere by infusing their will and personality with it.83 Through property
and recognition from others, individuals self-actualize. 84 In this quest to
self-actualize, however, some forms of property are more desirable than
others. Although one can physically seize a res nullius, Hegel suggests
that such a seizure would be qualitatively inferior to shaping (or creating)
an object or leaving one's mark on it.85 When an individual writes a
book or invents a machine and places his name or trademark on the ob-
ject, he is able to imbue more of his personality onto the external world
and acquires property that is more congruent with Hegel's Idea. 86 Mar-
garet Jane Radin relies on this notion when she argues that ideas are
76 Id.
77 See HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 56.
78 Id.
79 Id. ("To give form to something is the mode of taking possession most in keeping with
the Idea, inasmuch as it combines the subjective and the objective.").
80 Id. § 58.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 21.
84 Id.
85 Id. § 60.
86 See Hughes, supra note 11, at 339-44 (arguing that the degree to which intellectual
products contain the creator's personality depends on the type of product).
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closest to the "personhood ideal."'87 If intellectual creations, by virtue of
being most reflective of the creator's personality and will, are most con-
ducive to the individual's self-actualization, then the need to give the
creator IP rights is particularly strong.
Although Hegel's personality theory would justify and even demand
an individual's ability to create and that such an individual be recognized
for his creations, 88 such recognition should not necessitate large financial
compensation or others' exclusion from use.
Hegel draws a distinction between physical and intellectual prop-
erty.8 9 Unlike physical property, the use of which can be constrained in
manner and time, intellectual products are more universal and less open
to regulation. Both types of property, however, can be shared without
threatening the owner's sense of self.90 That ownership need not cease
upon another's use is clear in Hegel's distinction between partial or tem-
porary use or possession and actual ownership. 91
In the case of IP, the coexistence of others' use and the owner's (or
creator's) personality is even more possible. Hegel notes that the person
who acquires a book or other form of intellectual product "possesses its
entire use and value if he owns a single copy of it."'92 However, this
need not threaten the creator's being because "the author of the book or
the inventor of the technical device remains the owner of the universal
ways and means of reproducing such products and things, for he has not
immediately alienated these universal ways and means as such but may
reserve them for himself as his distinctive mode of expression. '9
3
Not only is sharing one's IP (even without imposing constraints on
others' use) entirely congruent with one's drive to personhood, but ar-
guably it is also in the owner's best interest to share. By allowing others
to use the inventor's "particular physical and mental skills and active
capabilities" for limited periods of time, they "acquire an external rela-
87 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY ch. 1; Hughes,
supra note 11.
88 See HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 44.
89 Id. § 69.
90 Id.
91 See HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 62.
92 Id. § 69.
93 See HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 69.
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tionship to [his or her] totality and universality.' 94 The creator thus
gains outside validation of his self-actualized being.
95
The question remains whether certain uses of the products could
harm the creator of the intellectual product, thereby meriting restrictions
on use. Recognizing the unique nature of intellectual creations in that
they are not merely possessions but also resources that can lead to uses
separate from initial purposes, Hegel briefly discusses the role of copy-
right protection and plagiarism. 96 While he recognized the idea that pro-
tection against theft of intellectual products helps further the sciences and
arts, he noted that plagiarism should be "a matter of honour, and honour
should deter people from committing it. ' '97 Hegel's lenience, while per-
haps surprising, derives from his understanding of the "destiny" of intel-
lectual products.98 By using, learning, and absorbing ideas and
knowledge from these intellectual products, individuals synthesize the
material into new formulations that, despite relying on already existing
ideas, can in turn be alienable creations in their own right.99 The re-
hashing of already existing points is simply the nature of intellectual pro-
gress in society. Thus, while such lenience could be subject to flagrant
abuse by dishonest intellectuals, plagiarism (and, by extension, other in-
fringements on patents) is more a concern with respect to the author's or
publisher's financial loss than it is with respect to the author's sense of
being.1oo
Hegel's nonchalance about potential financial losses is telling and
suggests that financial compensation for one's property is not a critical
concern. True, money allows individuals to acquire things that better
express their personalities, just as it is true that the ability to support
oneself through one's own activity and work instill feelings of "right,
integrity, and honour."''°  But money is not the end-it matters only inas
much as it allows individuals to acquire external things that, in turn, al-
94 Id. § 67. I have omitted Hegel's emphasis on the caveat that the use be temporarily
restricted because the caveat is most relevant with respect to an individual alienating his physi-
cal exertion. He wrote, "by alienating the whole of my time, as made concrete through work,
and the totality of my production, I would be making the substantial quality of the latter, i.e.
my universal activity and actuality of my personality itself, into someone else's property." Id.
In the case of IP, however, this is not as relevant since the individual need not give up the
essence of his work in allowing others to use it.
95 For elaboration on this point see Hughes, supra note 11, at 349-50.




IOO HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 69. For a discussion about the immorality surrounding
copyright infringement due to profit deprivation of the publisher, see IMMANUEL KANT, On the
Wrongfulness of Unauthorized Publication, in PRACTICAL PHILOsOPHY 8:70-8:87 (Mary J.
Gregor ed., 1996).
101 See HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 244.
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low individuals to self-actualize. 10 2 As long as an individual can self-
actualize by being identified with his creations, financial compensation
for intellectual products can be secondary.
0 3
This leads to the conclusion that allowing unlimited use of one's
intellectual products would not only be congruent with individuals' drive
to gain personhood but would also be beneficial. If individuals need rec-
ognition from their peers on their paths to personhood, then surely the
esteem, honor, and admiration that authors and inventors gain through
sharing their creations are particularly desirable forms of recognition.1t 4
While financial compensation is not crucial in this Hegelian world, it is
important that authors and inventors gain public recognition and continue
to be identified with their products.
105
D. UTILITARIAN / ECONOMIC RATIONALE: INCENTIVES
IP arguments generally break down along two lines: desert and in-
centives. The previous section explored desert-based arguments through
egalitarianism, Locke, and Hegel. In the aggregate, personality theory
supports inventors' right to public recognition but rejects their ability to
limit and maintain artificially high prices for their products. This section
explores economics and incentives-based arguments for IP and examines
existing practices, concluding that incentives-based arguments provide
the strongest defense for IP but that current IP practices over-incentivize
IP, in the process introducing social inefficiency, lowering social wel-
fare, and perhaps even impeding social progress.
0 6
Alan Ryan shifts the discussion from a question of desert to one of
incentives when he writes of the "consensus that 'it's his' invites the
further question, 'What good does its being his do for everyone
else?"1107 With this question, the focus changes from one centered on
the individual's right to one on public welfare. Irrespective of desert, the
102 "The rational aspect of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in
the superseding of mere subjectivity of personality." HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 41. Material
wealth as means to sustenance or as means to fulfill hedonist needs are secondary to the need
for existence as reason.
103 Id.
104 See Hughes, supra note 11, at 349-50.
105 The European system of IP protection adheres substantially to personality theory and
moral rights for the producer or author. When the United States joined the Berne Convention,
significant debate ensued about whether the U.S. could or would adhere to the moral rights
requirements. See generally Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to
the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 547-57 (1986). In 1990, the U.S.
Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which explicitly enacted protections
for, among other things, proper attribution of recognition to certain visual artists. See Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, P.L. 101-650, Title VI, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
106 For elaboration on this point, see William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 (1988).
107 See Waldron, supra note 2, at 845.
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final justification for property rights depends on the value it adds to the
rest of society.' 08 Striking a chord with economic theory, where finan-
cial rewards can change individuals' preferences and behaviors, the com-
mon wisdom is that IP promotes the overall progress of society. After
all, if one accepts self-interest-defined as individuals' disproportionate
valuation of their private utility over aggregate social utility-as the mo-
tivation of rational agents, then it is only logical for society to promote
its common welfare by creating incentives that align private with public
interest. 1°9 Based on this idea, the United States Constitution grants
Congress the power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries."' 1 0
Controversies have arisen on the interpretation of the length of time
and the manner in which exclusive rights can be expressed. Both of
these affect the financial returns of producers and the costs born by con-
sumers. Objections to IP practices from First Amendment advocates,
scholars, and aspiring creators center around fair use and have become
more salient in light of ever-expanding copyright protections and Title I
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, which virtually abol-
ishes fair use."' 1 These advocates argue that limitations on fair use, such
as those prohibiting the use of Mickey Mouse for parodies," t2 hamper
social progress. Lawrence Lessig uses a four-part rationale to argue that
IP rights can harm society: "Creativity and innovation always builds on
the past. The past always tries to control the creativity that builds upon
it. Free societies enable the future by limiting this power of the past.
Ours is less and less a free society."''
3
Arguing that IP can create incentives that encourage individuals to
create intellectual products is qualitatively different from arguing that
individuals will not produce without rewards associated with IP. The
promise of overwhelming financial rewards can maintain some individu-
als' effort toward success, but there is no conclusive empirical evidence
that lack of such rewards will deter individuals from completing their
work.
Existing business practices suggest that individuals might be happy
to complete their work for little more than recognition at the end. Royal-
108 Id.
109 This same idea justifies taxing behaviors with negative externalities, like industrial
pollution, and subsidizing activities with positive externalities. See NICHOLSON, supra note 24,
at 530-44.
110 U.S. CONST., art I, §8, cl.8.
I'' Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-203 (1998).
112 See Walt Disney Co. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (1978).
113 See Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address to Open Source Convention (August 15,
2002), available at http://www.oreillynet.comlpub/alpolicy/200
2 /08/15/lessig.html?page=l.
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ties for authors upon publication of most books generally range from 10
percent to 12.5 percent for hard cover books and 7.5 percent to 10 per-
cent for soft covers, but can be as low as 2 percent.' 14 The bulk of the
financial gain from such books flows to publishers, even when the book
is not solicited by the publisher but is entirely author-generated. Despite
this, the book industry is booming, with 150,000 books published in the
United States in 2002 alone,' 1 5 casting doubt on the idea that individuals
will be deterred from working towards progress in the absence of signifi-
cant financial gains.
Such evidence is not limited to copyrights but also exists in the
realm of patents. Scientists, for instance, who are hired at research insti-
tutions, do not generally retain any rights to their discoveries upon suc-
cessful completion of their projects. 116 Instead, under federal law, the
sponsoring institution receives the patent." 7 Nonetheless, many re-
searchers continue to work for research institutions, apparently happy to
get the opportunity to work on cutting-edge research and to contribute to
science, regardless of whether the researcher owns the patent and the
financial rewards that stem from it. Further, as Lessig discusses, ar-
rangements like LINUX and open source have created astonishingly fast
improvements in software by promoting unencumbered information
sharing. 118 At the very least, such evidence corroborates the claim that
the absence of IP rights can also promote social progress.
This evidence is not presented to invalidate the incentive argument.
Instead, it is presented to suggest that perhaps financial incentives are not
as fundamental as IP advocates would have us believe. Individuals ap-
pear to be at least as interested in name recognition and the ability to
114 See "Inside Publishing: Royalties and Advances," available at http://www.writersser-
vices.com/res/ri-adv-royalties.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2004).
115 See Ass'N OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITY PRESSES, AAUP AT-A-GLANCE, at http://aaup
net.org/news/glance.html (last visited Sept 13, 2004).
116 See, e.g., Ryan M. Seidemann, Authorship and Control: Ethical and Legal Issues of
Student Research in Archaeology, 14 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 451, 480 ("[Ulniversities often
own faculty-generated research."). Consider also the work-for-hire doctrine. By definition, a
"work for hire" is a work "prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplemen-
tary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or
as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). Rights to a work-for-hire
is owned by the "employer or other person for whom the work was prepared." 17 U.S.C.
§ 201 (2004).
117 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1998) This law provides that "[i]n the case of a work made
for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a
written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright."
118 See LAWRENCE LEsslG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 105-108 (1999).
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contribute to society as monetary gain. 19 Granted, legal clashes like that
at the University of Hawaii over researcher versus institutional owner-
ship of biotechnology exist and are related to financial gains, but those
have been relatively uncommon to date.'
20
Financial incentives in existing IP practices should resonate better
with publishing houses and research investors than with authors or re-
searchers. After all, it is these institutions which would financially bene-
fit the most from successful projects. 121 Indeed, research entities such as
pharmaceutical companies strongly lobby for continued patent rights,
threatening to exit the market if patents became imperiled. 122 TRIPS
negotiations and the domestic debate over CIPRO brought the centrality
of patents to pharmaceuticals' survival to the fore.123 From the pharma-
ceutical company's perspective, patents allow the recovery of costs while
providing the revenue stream necessary to fund other ongoing research
and development.'
24
119 Individual researcher-institution, particularly researcher-university, arrangements dif-
fer, depending on contract. The law allows institutions to own all rights to patents for the
successful product of a project if the employee was hired for a specific project. If, as in some
cases, the employee was hired for general purposes but used the institution's resources in the
creation of the intellectual product, the employer reserves a "shop right" to the invention. In
some institutions, such as Harvard, Stanford, and M.I.T., researchers share royalties the uni-
versity receives through discoveries. At the University of Hawaii, for instance, researchers
typically receive 50 percent of royalties the university receives. Common practice, however, is
that employees sign a contract that releases all claims to patent rights and transfers them to the
institution. See Alex Salkever, Ivory Tower: Who Owns the Clones, Salon.com (August 16,
1999) available at http://archive.salon.com/books/it/1999/08/16/clones/index.html.
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 55 (arguing that third parties often stand to gain most
financially from IP rights); KANT, supra note 100 (same).
122 Michael Woods, Food for Thought: The Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati Rice, 13
ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 123 (2002) (The United States sought "the codification of intellectual
property rights at the Uruguay Round in response to complaints by large pharmaceutical com-
panies regarding lost profits caused by a lack of effective enforcement of intellectual property
laws."); Peter Drahos, Building Institutions of Hope: Trading in Public Hope, 592 ANNALS 18
(2004) ("Pharmaceutical companies spend millions of dollars every year on lobbying activities
in an effort to persuade politicians and officials of the virtues of strengthening the patent
system."); Ana C. A. Muller, Nei Pereira Jr., & Adelaide Maria de Souza Antunes, Protecting
Biotechnological Inventions in Brazil and Abroad: Draft, Scope, and Interpretation of Claims,
13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 145 (2002) (noting that in pharmaceutical fields, "where the cost of
developing products from research to marketing is very high, the absence of a patent system or
a system with an adequate scope of protection would put research at risk"); cf. Steve P. Calan-
drillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating Their
Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L REF. 353, 398 (2004) (discussing that low profit margins have
caused pharmaceutical companies to exit the vaccines market).
123 Andrew Pollack, Drug Makers Wrestle with World's New Rules; A Delicate Balance:
Patriotism vs. Business, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at § 3, 1; Edmund L. Andrews, A Nation
Challenged: The Drug Maker; Drug Maker Seems Uncertain in Response to Cipro Frenzy,
N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 20, 2001, at Al.
124 This is the concept of cross-subsidies. See, e.g., Henry Grabowski, Politics and Avail-
ability: Patents and New Product Development in the Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology In-
dustries, 8 GEo. PUB. POL'Y REv. 7, 19 (2003) (noting that "[a] few blockbuster successes
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The need for financial recovery from the industry or investor per-
spective is undeniable, and not all of it should be dismissed as capitalist
greed. The average cost of "bringing a new chemical entity to market" is
approximately $359 million in 1993 dollars, with R&D accounting for
about 30 percent of total costs (assuming costs are discounted to their
present value at the time of the launch).' 25 These claims seem particu-
larly convincing when one considers that only a small proportion of
pharmaceutical projects actually reach the market. 126 Such figures and
industry claims still need to be balanced with the fact that pharmaceutical
manufacturers do earn significant profits. In fact, a 2000 study estimates
the pharmaceutical industry's profit margin at $27 million-a margin
that was higher than that of any other U.S. industry and four times that of
the average Fortune 500 Company at the time.127 The appropriate ques-
tion, then, may be less about the conceptual validity of incentives than
the magnitude of such financial motivation.
Moving beyond considerations of fairness, excessive financial re-
wards in IP create negative externalities that unduly burden society. Cur-
rent IP practices promote unnecessary social inefficiency in two main
ways. First, IP induces monopolistic behaviors that inefficiently reduce
consumer surplus and introduce significant deadweight loss by limiting
cover the losses on many other R&D investment projects"); Michele Creech, Make a Run for
the Border: Why the U.S. Government Is Looking to the International Market for Affordable
Prescription Drugs, 15 EMORY Wr'L L. REV. 593, 601 (2001) (noting the small success rate of
pharmaceutical products and stating that "it follows that successful medicines must cover the
costs of the unsuccessful ones").
125 Patricia Danzon, Parallel Trade and Comparative Pricing of Medicines: Poor Choice
for Patients?, available at http://www.pfizerforum.com/english/danzon.shtml (last visited
Sept. 13, 2004). A different study, which collected data on R&D costs on 68 randomly se-
lected drugs from 10 multinational firms, found that the average cost of bringing a new prod-
uct to market was $ 400 million. This figure includes money spent in the discovery, pre-
clinical, and clinical phases as well as an allocation for the cost of failures. The total R&D
cost of the pharmaceutical industry is thus pegged at $27 billion. Grabowski, supra note 124,
at 8-9. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturer's Association (PhRMA), the powerful
lobbying organization for pharmaceuticals, has consistently asserted that the average cost of
bringing a new drug to market is $500 million after an R&D phase that lasts 12 to 15 years.
Creech, supra note 124, at 601 (2001).
126 According to PhRMA, only one of every 5,000 new medicines tested is approved for
use after clinical trials. Creech, supra note 124, at 601. See also Biotech, Drug Finns Sharing
Secrets on the Internet, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, May 13, 2001, at 2F (describing one
company which created 80,000 biotechonology components but turned only ten into marketa-
ble drugs).
127 Creech, supra note 124, at 610 ("The median return on equity of the pharmaceutical
members of the Fortune 500 was 35.8% in 1999, more than double the median return for the
Fortune 500 as a whole."). See also Lester C. Thurow, Profits, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF ECONOMICS, available at http://www.econlib.org/librarylEnc/Profits.html (last visited
Sept. 1, 2004); Grabowski, supra note 124, at 8 (noting that some have "called for the abolish-
ment of pharmaceutical patents on the grounds that they give rise to excessive profits and high
prices on new medicines).
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access and keeping prices artificially high.' 28 Second, the skyrocketing
monetary values of patents promote costly lawsuits that reduce social
welfare for reasons aside from cost.' 29 In response to recent high-profile
legal patent disputes, risk-averse investors have begun to pull resources
out of companies, start-ups, and research projects for fear of insufficient
returns. 130 Excessive financial rewards thus can reduce social efficiency
and indirectly reduce research projects, in both cases undermining the
purpose of IP.
The following section proposes a new IP model that seeks to maxi-
mize social welfare and minimize social inefficiency while maintaining
sufficient financial incentives for the development of intellectual
products.
II. TOWARD A NEW SYSTEM: THE COMPENSATED
IP PROPOSAL
The objective of the Compensated IP Proposal is to create a more
philosophically just IP system that simultaneously acknowledges incen-
tives as essential in promoting the creation of IP products. By ensuring
that incentives are not excessively high, however, this Proposal expands
consumer and minimizes deadweight loss. The Proposal addresses de-
sert-based criticisms of IP, discussed in Section I of this essay, by pro-
posing a system in which the public gains unencumbered access to the
product, thereby meeting Locke's "no waste" and "no harm" princi-
ples.13' At the same time, the Proposal compensates inventors for their
labor and maintains their right to public recognition, thereby fulfilling
Hegelian prescriptions for self-actualization.
1 32
A. OVERVIEW
At the outset, it is worth noting that (as will become clear below)
this model would work best in the context of research entities that are
repeat players, have easily quantifiable returns, and seek patents. Thus,
although it is possible to adapt the model to copyrights, the discussion in
128 See NICHOLSON, supra note 24, at 554; see also Fisher, supra note 106. Fisher argues
that IP exacerbates inefficient allocation of resources by forcing society to sacrifice consumer
surplus that would have been created by potential scholars who could simply not afford access
to intellectual products.
129 See Weintraub, supra note 6, at 95.
130 Id.
131 See LOCKE, supra note 31, at § 31, 308. Locke's "no waste" and "no harm" principles
are the reason why simply reducing the duration of a patent or copyright would not suffice.
For any length of time where access to products is limited, consumer welfare decreases and
other creators' work is impeded.
132 See HEGEL, supra note 69, at § 41.
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this section will be limited to research entities, the primary examples of
which are pharmaceutical companies.
The Compensated IP Proposal is simple and has two central compo-
nents. First, all patented products immediately become available for
unencumbered public use. Second, creators of the IP receive compensa-
tion from the government in exchange for public access, and the compen-
sation is based on a calculation that primarily considers producers' R&D
costs. Creators continue to receive acknowledgments and recognition, as
they do under the current system.
Michael Polanyi published a patent reform proposal in 1944 with
elements similar to those presented herein. 133 Specifically, Polanyi ar-
gued that intellectual products should be immediately available to the
public in exchange for producers' compensation by the government. 134
Under his system, use of the product would be free, but users would be
required to license the invention and inform the patentee of the value
they derived from the invention. 135 The aggregate value of the invention,
as reported by users, then would serve as the basis for the level of the
compensation to the inventor. 136 As subsequent scholars have argued,
however, a value-based IP compensation approach is both philosoph-
ically flawed and pragmatically problematic. Edwin Hettinger questions
the justness of individuals receiving compensation based on market price
(analogous to "value" in this case) since they do not set the market
price.137 Patrick Croskery points out that accountants cannot possibly
assess the created value with accuracy, particularly when self-interest can
factor to skew the analysis. Such an administrability problem would cre-
ate a substantial monitoring cost if the honesty of patentees' reports to
the government is to be ensured, 138 and the system of appropriately com-
pensating the inventor would be undermined.' 39
The Compensated IP Proposal departs from this demand-based ap-
proach of compensating inventors to adopt a more supply-based ap-
proach. In doing so, it shifts its focus from one centered on value to one
centered on cost. At the core of the Proposal is one simple proposition:
Firms are risk averse and will gladly accept a lower level of compensa-
tion in exchange for the elimination of all production risks.
133 See generally Michael Polanyi, Patent Reform, REV. ECON. STUD. 61-76 (SUMMER,
1944).
134 See Patrick Croskery, Institutional Utilitarianism and Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 631, 638-40. (1993). See also Polanyi, supra note 133, at 61-63. See generally
Russell Hardin, Valuing Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 659 (1993) (critiquing
Polanyi's and Croskery's arguments).
135 See Polanyi, supra note 133, at 61, 67.
136 Id.
137 See Hettinger, supra note 19, at 39.
138 See Croskery, supra note 134, at 638-40.
139 See id. See generally Hardin, supra note 134.
THE COMPENSATED IP PROPOSAL
B. THE ECONOMIC MODEL
Understanding two factors is crucial to understanding this Proposal.
First, firms make production decisions in such a way as to maximize
profits. 140 When firms face risk and uncertainty, however, they also fac-
tor in the size of risk into their calculations. 14' The most important fac-
tor in a company's production decision in such a case is expected profit.
To calculate expected profit, two factors are the most relevant: (1) possi-
ble profit outcomes [rri] and (2) the probability associated with suc-
ceeding and actually achieving such a profit [p]. 142 Expected profit [ETT]
equals the sum of all possible profit levels, weighted by their respective
probabilities [Xpilri].
14 3
Second, firms are generally risk averse, '" which makes them likely
to change their behavior in response to government initiatives that mini-
mize or eliminate risk. The classical uncertainty and insurance model
below helps to illustrate this point and the Proposal.
140 The idea that firms are rational actors whose overarching goal is profit maximization
is fundamental in economic theory. For a good introduction to microeconomic theory, see
NICHOLSON, supra note 24, at ch. 7.
141 The theory of risk and uncertainty, particularly as it relates to insurance schemes, is
also prominent in microeconomic theory. While I explain it to the extent necessary to under-
stand the Compensated IP Proposal, a very good and thorough explanation of the theory can be
found in NICHOLSON, supra note 24, at ch. 15.
142 The probability associated with a stated profit is simply the difference between I and
the risk percentage. For example, assume that a project has a 10% chance of failing but would
earn $1000 in profit if it were to succeed. The risk here would be .1, and the profit [p] would
be $1000. The probability of achieving the p would be [I - .1], or .9; this .9 would be "p."
143 Continuing with the example in the last footnote, assume that a project has a .9
probability of achieving the $1000 profit. Further assume that the project will earn $0 if it
fails. The probability of failing, again, is 10 percent, or 0.1. The expected profit for the
project would then be [(.9 * 1000) + (.1 * 0)] = $900. This analysis would not change if the
profit associated with failure were non-zero.
144 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental Premises of Partnership
Taxation, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 290 (1993) ("Recent finance literature sees the firm as a
risk-averse individual making decisions based upon perceptions of firm strength."); Bruce
Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Asymmetric Information and the New Theory of the Firm:
Financial Constraints and Risk Behavior 11-12 (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 3359, 1990); Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20
YALE J. ON REG. 139, 159-60, 177 (2003) (accepting firms' risk-aversion as fundamental pre-
mise). Note also that for a risk neutral firm, the company's CE equals its En. In the aggre-
gate, there would be no transfer of welfare from producers to consumers or to the government.
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In this model, which mimics the insurance market, the pharmaceutical
company faces two possible outcomes. Much like consumers in the in-
surance market, the company faces a "good state of the world," where
the product succeeds, and a "bad state of the world," where the product
fails. In the "good state," the company's successful product yields Tr2,
which is a high profit level. In the "bad state," the company receives mr,,
a much lower profit level. Note that rr, could be zero or negative, which
would change the graph and some of the numbers but not the analytics of
this model.
The U(r) curve graphically depicts the company's utility function,
which measures the utility the company derives [measured on the y-axis]
for each level of profits actually received [measured on the x-axis]. The
curve is concave because of the assumption, as stated above, that firms
are risk averse.146
The weighted average of the two possible profit levels is pirr, +
p2rr2, which equals expected profit [Err]. In other words, the expected
profit for the firm is the sum of (1) the probability of the project failing
[pl], multiplied by the profit associated with such failure [pl] and (2) the
probability of the project succeeding [P2] multiplied by the profit associ-
ated with such success [P2]. In the real world, if Enr exceeds an inter-
nally-determined threshold amount, the company will typically proceed
with the project.
145 See NICHOLSON, supra note 24, at 504.
146 The concavity of the curve due to risk aversion is conceptually related to the concept
of diminishing marginal utility. This connection, while conceptually relevant, is not crucial to
an understanding of the Proposal and is therefore not detailed. For an explanation of the link,
however, see NICHOLSON, supra note 24, at 503.
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As the utility curve [U(p)] depicts, each of the outcomes [i.e., rr1,
En, and rr2] has an associated level of utility, or welfare. The utility that
the firm derives from nl is U(rj) and is noted by point "a" in the graph.
The utility that the firm derives from P2 is U(p 2) and is noted by point "b"
in the graph. The straight line connecting points "a" and "b" is the "risk-
free line," which is used to determine the "certainty equivalent" [CE].
The CE is the specific amount of profit that, if received entirely risk-free,
would give the company as much utility as it would get from Ep in a
risky environment.
147
For a risk-averse firm, the risk-free line will always be inside the
utility curve because of the curve's concavity. The CE will therefore
always be lower than Ep. This graphical outcome is logical on a concep-
tual level because a risk-averse firm should always be happy to forego
some profit in exchange for eliminating risk and avoiding a risky gamble.
The more risk averse a firm is, the lower its CE will be, because the more
the firm would be willing to give up to eliminate risk.
148
As shown on the graph, U(E(rr)) is the utility that the firm would
obtain if Ep were obtained with certainty. That is, if the firm were guar-
anteed Ep and then actually realized that Ep, then its level of welfare
would be U(E(p)). E(U(r)), on the other hand, is a value that includes
risk. It is the weighted average of the possible utility outcomes. More
precisely, E(U(Tr)) is the sum of [pU(n1)] and [p2U(r)]. Because
E(U(iT)) incorporates risk, and the firm is risk averse, it corresponds to a
lower level of utility than U(E(Tr)).
The certainty equivalent, CE, is the amount of profit that yields the
same utility as E(U(p)). As the graph depicts, the CE involves substan-
tially less profit than Ep but it yields the same amount of utility because
it is received risk-free.
The conclusion, then, is simple. As long as the amount of profit that
the firm receives with certainty exceeds CE, the rational firm will prefer
that amount and avoid the gamble. It is this concept that forms the back-
bone of the Compensated IP Proposal: in exchange for eliminating risk, a
risk-averse firm will gladly accept a lower level of profits for its inven-
tions. This lower level of profits implies a lower price, a higher output,
and an increase in consumer welfare.
149
147 Recall that Ep incorporates risk because it is the weighted sum of the two possible
profit levels. By definition, the utility that the firm derives from receiving the certainty
equivalent without risk is the same utility that it derives from receiving Ep with risk. That
utility level is E(U(p)).
148 See NICHOLSON, supra note 24, at 503-05.
149 See NICHOLSON, supra note 24, at 116-20 (discussing consumer surplus).
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C. THE MECHANICS OF THE COMPENSATED IP PROPOSAL
Following the described economic model, the bottom line of this
Proposal is simple. The government acts as a type of insurer and funds
research entities for all of their projects at a level that slightly exceeds
the CE. In exchange, the government receives the intellectual property
right and can make the product fully available to the public.
As with any insurance scheme, however, there will be moral haz-
ard,150 and safeguards are necessary. Here, moral hazard can be two-
fold. Removal of risk from the company's equation in this model could
lead firms to (1) choose inefficient methods of research and/or (2) reck-
lessly excessively high-risk projects.
To guard against such behavior, the Proposal would introduce a re-
quirement that companies maintain a project portfolio whose aggregate
risk remains below a pre-determined level. Specifically, the pre-deter-
mined level could simply be the company's own aggregate risk level
prior to participating in this Proposal.1 51 Using aggregate risk of the
portfolio as the determinant instead of capping the risk on individual
projects would give the company continued flexibility in managing its
own portfolio and reduce criticism about governmental involvement.
A second concern is misrepresentation by the firm about its R&D
costs. Because the Proposal would compensate companies for R&D,'
52
companies may be tempted to overstate their R&D costs in the final re-
port. To alleviate such temptation, governmental guidelines may be nec-
essary. The government could require detailed research proposals from
companies, complete with rigid budget estimates, prior to the projects'
commencement. At the same time, a separate governmental entity could
research the validity and reasonableness of such requests and budgets.
This need not mean that the government controls the substance of
the research. The sole purpose of this governmental investigation would
be to confirm the project's reported probability for success, the accuracy
of cost estimates, and the efficiency of research methodology, before the
firm begins its work.
150 Id. at 507 (discussing moral hazard in the context of insurance schemes).
151 Thus, if the company's prior aggregate risk level was .2, the company would be re-
quired to maintain a portfolio whose risk did not exceed .2 after entering the program.
152 By definition, profit is the excess of revenue over cost. As stated above, firms look to
profit, not revenue or cost, in determining output and deciding which projects to pursue. Con-
sequently, the Proposal also expresses the CE in terms of profit. It is clear that payment of the
profit also involves payment of the cost-R&D-because profit, by definition, includes cost.
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D. DISCUSSION
At a level slightly above CE, the level of compensation would be
sufficiently high to incentivize the firm's continued operation 53 while
simultaneously being low enough for consumers to capture welfare from
the producers. More precisely, the amount of welfare that consumers
would capture from producers is the difference between Ep and CE.
As stated above, all projects yield expected profits of E. However,
since CE is less than Enr due to risk aversion, and since companies only
receive CE under the Proposal, they forego the difference between Err
and CE. This difference, previously absorbed by companies, now is
transferred to consumers in the form of lower prices. Total consumer
welfare under this Proposal rises by the difference between Err and CE
aggregated across all research projects.
In sum, this model is desirable to risk-averse firms because it allows
them to pursue their high-risk projects without the fear of unsustainable
losses at the end. The model predicts that by being paid at a slightly
higher rate than CE, rational companies will continue all of their
projects. In exchange, products become more freely available on the
market at a lower price. Unrestricted access to the products, priced sig-
nificantly below what private companies would have charged, minimizes
the social inefficiency and deadweight loss that currently exist due to
artificially constrained supply and artificially high prices.
Nonetheless, concerns about this model can be grouped into two
separate categories-cost, and de-democratization of research. The fol-
lowing subsection addresses some central concerns in limited detail.
1. Cost of Implementation
Critics may argue that this program would be prohibitively expen-
sive to the government. As a practical matter, however, such costs will
be minimal and consist primarily of administration expenses. While it is
true that the government needs to pay the firm an amount slightly above
CE, it is important to remember that the government is not the ultimate
bearer of this cost. Rather, consumers are the ultimate payers because
they are the ones who actually purchase the products for consumption
later on. As stated above, however, consumers are better off because, in
the aggregate, they only have to pay the firm CE, which is substantially
lower than Ep.
It is also worth noting that this model has a built-in feature that
serves as a safeguard to make it more cost-sustainable. By their nature,
high-risk projects have low CE's because the CE is related to the
153 See above. Note also that since profit equals revenue minus cost, the "CE" and "Efr"
levels of profit here, by definition, already include all research and development costs.
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probability associated with the project's success. The lower the
probability of success, the lower the Ep. Because CE is always below Ep
for a risk-averse firm, a high-risk project means a low CE. This suggests
that the actual costs to the government will be low.
2. De-democratization of Research
The concept of governmental funds for research raises worries
among many. As Wendy Gordon wrote, "[a] democratic society de-
mands decentralized and diverse creation in the intellectual sphere; free-
dom from state control is essential lest freedom of expression be
curtailed by fear of governmental reprisal."'154 It is important to note that
the Compensated IP Proposal is designed such that the government ap-
proves projects based not on substance, but based only on efficiency of
research and development methodology and companies' aggregated risk.
Perspective may be helpful in further assessing the de-democratization
claim.
According to the Association of American Universities, universities
perform thirteen percent of total national research and development and
fifty-four percent of national basic research.155 The federal government
supports fifty-eight percent of research performed at these institutions; in
the year 2002, federal funds to support university research totaled $22
billion. 156 At the same time, universities are widely acknowledged to be
leading sources of innovation.'
57
The proposed system of IP, under which government funding is
more pervasive in exchange for the public's unrestricted access to the
intellectual products, is thus less radical an idea than it might initially
appear. Its primary function would be to reduce the risk experienced by
entities while expanding the common.
CONCLUSION
Current IP practices are philosophically problematic on two main
grounds. First, IP restricts and even excludes an individual's access to
and use of the product, violating Locke's "no waste" and "no harm" prin-
ciples. Second, IP creates high financial rewards for patent holders at a
154 See Gordon, supra note 39, at 1612.
155 University Research: The Role of Government Funding, ASSOcIATION OF AMERICAN
UNIVERSITIES 1 (Feb. 2004), at http://www.aau.edu/resuniv/GvtFunding.pdf (last visited Sept.
13, 2004).
156 Id.
157 See, e.g., John Markoff, National Science Foundation Announces Grant Winners,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at C5 (stating that many of the grants for scientific research go to
universities); Karen W. Arenson, Columbia Sets the Pace in Profiting Off Research, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at B 1, B6 (stating that Columbia and other universities are rapidly in-
creasing research innovations).
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cost to consumers that are unjustifiable on egalitarian desert grounds.
Incentives-based justifications of IP are generally more convincing but
cannot justify the excessive financial rewards condoned by current IP
practices.
The Compensated IP Proposal addresses egalitarian and Lockean
concerns while fulfilling utilitarian concerns and the Hegelian require-
ment of public recognition for creators' work. By ensuring that intellec-
tual products immediately enter society for unencumbered use, the
Proposal meets Locke's principles. The Proposal's use of cost-based
compensation, as a proxy for effort-based pay, alleviates egalitarian con-
cerns of existing unjustifiably high payments. Analysis of firms' utility
and risk aversion would allow the government to determine the appropri-
ate compensation level for the company where incentives would be just
high enough to encourage continued research. Finally, the system mini-
mizes the deadweight loss and social inefficiency that result from artifi-
cially high prices and low supplies. The Proposal thus maintains
incentives and the public recognition associated with IP while simultane-
ously redressing philosophical shortcomings.
Certainly, political and social sentiments comprise substantial obsta-
cles to implementation of the Compensated IP Proposal. However, re-
cent advances, such as those in biotechnology, have escalated debates
about IP that may soon necessitate a thorough reevaluation of the system.
In assessing the justice of our evolving IP system, it will be important to
refresh our understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of IP and
keep the system congruent with philosophical principles in sight. The
author of this article hopes to have contributed to such efforts.
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